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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain, the technology that underpins the great success of Bitcoin [18] and various other
cryptocurrencies, has incredibly emerged as a trending research topic in both academic institutes
and industries associations in recent years. With great potential and benefits, the blockchain
technology promises a new decentralized platform for the economy such that the possibility of
censorship, monopoly, and single point of failures can be eliminated [26]. The technology, in its
simplest form, can be seen as a decentralized database or digital ledger that contains append-only
data blocks where each block is comprised of valid transactions, timestamp and the cryptographic
hash of the previous block. By design, a blockchain system is managed by nodes in a peer-to-peer
network and operates efficiently in a decentralized fashion without the need of a central authority.
Specifically, it enables a trustless network where participants of the system can settle transactions
without having to trust each other. With the aid of the smart contracts technology, a blockchain
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system can enable a wide range of applications that go beyond financial transactions [29]. In the
context of blockchain, smart contracts are defined as self-executing and self-enforcing programs
that are stored on chain. They are intended to facilitate and verify the execution of terms and
conditions of a contract within the blockchain system. By employing this technology, applications
that previously require a trusted intermediary can now operate in a decentralized manner while
achieving the same functionality and certainty. For that reason, blockchain and smart contracts
together have inspired many decentralized applications and stimulated scientific research in diverse
domains [1, 2, 4, 14, 19, 20, 22].
An auction is a market institution in which traders or parties submit bids that can be an offer
to buy or sell at a given price [9]. A market can enable only buyers, only sellers, or both to make
offers. In the latter case, it is referred as a two-sided or double auction. A double auction process
can be one-shot or iterative (repeated). The difference between them is that an iterative double
auction process has multiple, instead of one, iterations [21]. In each iteration, each party submits a
bid illustrating the selling/buying price and supplying/demanding units of resource. This process
goes on until the market reaches Nash Equilibrium (NE). In practice, the iterative double auction
has been widely used for decentralized resource allocations among rational traders, especially
for divisible resources, such as energy trading [8, 14], mobile data offloading [11], or resource
allocation in autonomous networks [12]. In these applications, in each iteration, players submit
their individual bids, respectively, to an auctioneer who later calculates to determine the resource
allocation with respect to the submitted bids. However, current implementations of double auction
systems require a centralized and trusted auctioneer to regulate the auction process. This results in
the risk of single point of failures, monopoly, and bribery.
Although many research work have tried to develop a trading system combining the iterative
double auction and blockchain [14, 28], nonetheless, they still need a trusted third-party to handle
the auction process. In this work, we leverage blockchain and smart contracts to propose a general
framework for iterative double auction that is completely decentralized and trustless. We argue
that, due to the low throughput of blockchain, a naive and straightforward adoption of blockchain
smart contracts to eliminate the trusted third-party would result in significantly high latency
and transaction fees. To overcome this problem, we adopt the state channel technology [6] with
extension to support computation among more than two parties, so that we can enable efficient off-
chain execution of decentralized applications without changing the trust assumption. Specifically,
we propose a double auction framework operating through a state channel that can be coupled to
existing double auction algorithms to run the auction process efficiently.
To demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of our solution, we develop a proof-of-concept
implementation of the proposed solution. This proof-of-concept is built based on our novel de-
velopment framework that can be used to deploy any distributed protocols using blockchain and
state channels, which is also introduced in this paper. Based on the proof-of-concept, we conduct
experiments and measure the performance in various aspects, the results suggest that our proposed
solution can carry out a double auction process on blockchain that is both time- and cost-saving
with a relatively small overhead.
Contributions. We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We introduce a novel decentralized and trustless framework for iterative double auction based
on blockchain. With this framework, existing double auction algorithms can efficiently run
on a blockchain network without suffering the high latency and fees of on-chain transactions.
• We enhance the state channel technology, which is currently limited to two participants, to
support multiparty computation. Based on this enhancement, we present a formal develop-
ment of our solution, in which we develop a Universally Composable (UC)-style model [3]
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for the double auction protocol and prove the security properties of our design using the
simulation-based UC framework.
• To validate our proposed solution, we develop a proof-of-concept implementation of the
framework to demonstrate its feasibility. For this implementation, we also introduce a novel
development framework for distributed computing using blockchain and state channel. The
framework is developed using the Elixir programming language and the system can be
deployed on an Ethereum blockchain [7].
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The relatedwork is summarized
in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the integration of Blockchain and double auction to establish some
security goals for the system. We first present a straw-man design and then provide a high-level
view of our framework. Then, we provide formal security definitions and specifications with a
detailed security analysis of our framework in Section 4. Section 5 presents the proof-of-concept
implementation along with the system evaluation. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Double auction based on blockchain. As blockchain is an emerging technology, there has been
many research work addressing double auction with blockchain. Recently, Thakur et al [27]
published a paper on distributed double auction for peer to peer energy trading. The authors use
the McAfee mechanism to process the double auction on smart contracts. In [17], the authors
presented BlockCloud, which is a service-centric blockchain architecture that supports double
auction. The auction model in this work uses a trade-reduction mechanism. However, the double
auction mechanism in these work is one-shot and is only applicable to single-unit demands. For
applications like energy or wireless spectrum allocation, these models greatly limit users’ capability
to utilize the products [25].
In [14] and [28] , the authors propose blockchain-based energy trading using double auction.
The auction mechanism is implemented as an iterative process which can be used for divisible
goods. Although the system presented in these papers employs blockchain, the double auction
process is still facilitated by a central entity. The blockchain is only used for settling payments. Our
work is fundamentally different as we aim to design a framework that can regulate the iterative
double auction process in a decentralized and trustless fashion.
State channel. Although there has been many research effort on payment channels [5, 15, 16],
the concept of state channel has only emerged in recent years. As payment channel is limited to
payment transactions, state channel is a generalization of payment channel in which users can
execute complex smart contracts off-chain while still maintaining the trustless property. Instead of
executing the contracts on-chain and having all the transactions validated by every blockchain
nodes, the state channel technologies allow users to update the states off-chain with the option
to raise disputes on-chain. Thus, it offers an efficient solution to address the scalability issue of
blockchain systems. Dziembowski et al. [6] is the first work that present formal specifications of
state channels. However, the authors did not develop any proof-of-concept implementation to
validate their protocol.
One problem with the original concept of state channels is that they only support execution
between two parties, which is not applicable to our scenario since we are dealing with a system of
multiple parties. For that reason, based on the work in [6], we extend the state channel technology
to a multiparty state channel that can support computation among multiple users. Our extension
also provides additional functionalities to handle dynamic changes of system participants. Based
on this multiparty state channel, we design our double auction framework and analyze its security
properties in the UC model.
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3 DOUBLE AUCTIONWITH BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we formally define the double auction model that is used in this work. Moreover,
beginning with a straw-man design, we present the high-level design of our framework and its
security goals.
3.1 Auction model
We consider a set of parties that are connected to a blockchain network. We divide the set of parties
into a set B of buyers who require resources from a set S of sellers. These two sets are disjoint. The
demand of a buyer i ∈ B is denoted as di and the supply of a seller j ∈ S is denoted as sj . In this
work, we adopt the auction model proposed in [30], which elicits hidden information about parties
in order to maximize social welfare, as a general iterative double auction process that converges to
a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
A bid profile of a buyer i ∈ B is denoted as bi = (βi ,xi ) where βi is the buying price per unit
of resource and xi is the amount of resource that i wants to buy. Likewise, a bid profile of a seller
j ∈ S is denoted as bj = (α j ,yj ) where α j is the selling price per unit of resource and yj is the
amount of resource that j wants to supply.
The auction process consists of multiple iterations. At an iteration k , the buyers and sellers submit
their bid profiles b(k )i and b
(k )
j , respectively, to the auctioneer. Then, a double auction algorithm
will be used to determine the best response b(k+1)i and b
(k+1)
j for the next iteration. This process
goes on until the auction reaches NE, at which the bid demand and supply (xi ,yj ) will converge to
an optimal value that maximizes the social welfare. An example of such algorithm can be referred
to [30]. The pseudo code for a centralized auctioneer is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
k ← 1
while not NE do
Receive bid profiles b(k )i and b
(k )
j from buyers and sellers
Compute best responses b(k+1)i and b
(k+j)
j
Send b(k+1)i and b
(k+1)
j back to sellers and buyers
k← k + 1
end while
3.2 Straw-man design
In this section, we present a design of the trading system. The trading mechanism must meet the
following requirements:
(a) Decentralized: the auction process is not facilitated by any central middleman
(b) Trustless: the parties do not have to trust each other.
(c) Non-Cancellation: parties may attempt to prematurely abort from the protocol to avoid
payments. These malicious parties must be financially penalized.
Based on the requirements, we will first show a straw-man design of the system which has some
deficiencies in terms of latency and high transaction fee. Then, we will propose a trading system
using state channels to address those problems.
In this system, we deploy a smart contract to the blockchain to regulate the trading process. Prior
to placing any bid, all parties must make a deposit to the smart contract. If a party tries to cheat by
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Fig. 1. Auction phase
prematurely aborting the trading process, he or she will lose that deposit and the remaining parties
will receive compensation. Therefore, the deposit deters parties from cheating. At the end of the
trading process, these deposits will be returned to the parties.
In this straw-man design, the auction process will be executed on-chain, that is, the smart
contract will act as an auctioneer and thus will execute Algorithm 1. As the auction process consists
of multiple iterations, the system will follow the activity diagram in Figure 1 at each iteration.
At an iteration k , all buyers and sellers submit their bids b(k )i and b
(k )
j , respectively, to the smart
contract. In order to avoid unresponsiveness, a timeout is set for collecting bids. Should any parties
fail to meet this deadline, the system considers that they aborted the process.
The smart contract then determines the best response b(k+1)i and b
(k+j)
j for buyers and sellers,
respectively, until the trading system reaches NE. This design works, however, has two main
disadvantages:
(1) Transaction latency: each message exchanged between parties and the smart contract is
treated as a blockchain transaction which takes time to get committed.
(2) High computational complexity on the smart contract which means that the blockchain will
require high transaction fees.
These disadvantages come from the fact that a transaction in a blockchain network has to be
confirmed by all the validators. In other words, with this design, the buyers and sellers are having
the entire blockchain to process their auction, which is very inefficient and, thus, not practical. In
the following section, we will propose another design to overcome these issues.
3.3 Blockchain with multiparty state channels
As the double auction process involves multiple iterations, state channel [6] is a proper solution to
address the deficiencies of the straw-man design. Instead of processing the auction on-chain, the
parties will be able to update the states of the auction off-chain. Whenever something goes wrong
(e.g., some parties try to cheat), the users always have the option of referring back to the blockchain
ACM Trans. Internet Technol., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2020.
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Fig. 2. Multiparty state channel: overview
for the certainty of on-chain transactions. Since the original concept of state channel only supports
the computation between two parties, in this work, we propose an extension to support multiparty
computation that can work with the double auction. This section illustrates a high-level view of
how we can conduct a double auction using the multiparty state channel.
In the samemanner as the straw-man design, the parties deploy a smart contract to the blockchain.
However, this smart contract does not regulate the auction process, but instead acts as a judge to
resolve disputes. The parties must also make a deposit to this contract prior to the auction. Figure 2
illustrates the overview of the operations in the multiparty state channel.
After deploying the smart contract, the parties can now begin the auction process in a state
channel. At each iteration k of the auction, we define two operations: (1) collecting bids and (2)
determining the best responses. Denoting the set of parties as P = B ∪ S = {p1,p2, ...,pn}, in the
first operation, each party broadcasts a blockchain transaction containing its bid b(k )pi to all other
parties. Note that this transaction is a valid blockchain transaction and it is only broadcasted locally
among the parties. Upon receiving that transaction, each party has to verify the transaction’s
signature. After this operation, each party now has the bid profiles of all other parties.
Then we move to the second operation of determining the best response. A party will be chosen
to compute the best responses, in fact, it does not matter who will execute this computation because
the results will later be verified by other parties. Therefore, this party can be chosen randomly
or based on the amount of deposit to the smart contract. Let pk be the one who carries out the
computation at iteration k , Gk be the result that consists of the best response b(k+1)pi for each party
pi , pk will broadcast a blockchain transaction containingGk to all other parties. Upon receiving this
transaction, each party has to verify the resultGk , then signs it and broadcasts another transaction
containing Gk to all other parties. This action means that the party agrees with Gk . After this step,
each party will have Gk together with the signatures of all parties.
When the auction process reaches NE, a party will send the final Gk together with all the
signatures to the smart contract. The smart contract then verifies theGk and if there is no dispute,
the state channel is closed. Finally, the payment will be processed on-chain and the smart contract
refunds the initial deposit to all parties. The entire process is summarized in the sequence diagram
in Figure 3.
As can be seen, the blockchain is invoked only two times and thus saves tons of transaction fees
comparing to the straw-man design. Moreover, as the transactions are not sent to the blockchain,
the latency is only limited by the communication network among the parties. We can also see
that the bid profiles are only known among the involving parties, not to the entire blockchain,
thus enhances the privacy. In this section, we only provide a very abstract workflow of the system
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Fig. 3. Sequence diagram of the double auction process. Here we single out one party pk to elucidate the
interactions among parties
without considering the security and privacy. In the following sections, we provide more detail
operations of the proposed protocol as well as how we ensure the system is secured.
3.4 Security and privacy goals
Before we present the formal development of our solution, we establish the threat model as well as
security and privacy goals for our system. In this work, we consider a computationally efficient
adversary who can corrupt any subset of parties. By corruption, the attacker can take full control
over a party which includes acquiring the internal state and all the messages destined to that party.
Moreover, it can send arbitrary messages on the corrupted party’s behalf.
With respect to the adversarial model, we define the security and privacy notions of interest as
follows:
• Unforgeability: We use the ECDSA signature scheme which is believed to be unforgeable
against chosen message attack [13]. This signature scheme is currently being used by the
Ethereum blockchain [29].
• Non-Repudiation: Once a party has submitted a bid, the system assures that he or she must
not be able to deny having made the relevant bid.
• Public Verifiability: All parties can be publicly verified if they have been following the auction
protocol correctly.
• Robustness: The auction process can tolerate invalid bids and dishonest participants who are
not following the auction protocol correctly.
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• Input independence: Each party does not see others’ bid before committing to their own.
• Liveness: In an optimistic case when all parties are honest, the computation is processed
within a small amount of time (off-chain messages only). When some parties are corrupted,
the computation is completed within a predictable amount of time.
4 DOUBLE AUCTION USING MULTIPARTY STATE CHANNELS
In this section, we describe the ideal functionality of our system that defines how a double auction
process is operated using the multiparty state channel technology. We show that the ideal function-
ality achieves the security goals. Afterwards, we present the design of our protocol that realizes
the ideal functionality. Finally, a detailed security proof in the UC framework is given.
4.1 Security model
The entities in our system are modeled as interactive Turing machines that communicate with
each other via a secure and authenticated channel. The system operates in the presence of an
adversary A who, upon corruption of a party p, seizes the internal state of p and all the incoming
and outgoing packets of p.
4.1.1 Assumptions and Notation. We denote P = B ∪ S = {p1,p2, ...,pn} as the set of n parties.
We assume that P is known before opening the state channel and |P | ≥ 2. The blockchain is
represented as an append-only ledger L that is managed by a global ideal functionality FL (such
as [6]). The state of FL is defined by the current balance of all accounts and smart contracts’ state;
and is publicly visible to all parties. FL supports the functionalities of adding or subtracting one’s
balance. We also denote F (x) as retrieving the current value of the state variable x from an ideal
functionality F .
We further assume that any message destined to FL can be seen by all parties (in the same
manner as blockchain transactions are publicly visible). For simplicity, we assume that all parties
have enough fund in their accounts for making deposits to the smart contract. Furthermore, each
party and the ideal functionality will automatically discard any messages originated from a party
that is not in P or the message’s signature is invalid.
4.1.2 Communication. In this work, we assume a synchronous communication network. We define
a round as a unit of time corresponding to the maximum delay needed to transmit an off-chain
message between a pair of parties. Any modifications on FL and smart contracts take at most
∆ ∈ N rounds, this ∆ reflects the fact that updates on the blockchain are not instant but can be
completed within a predictable amount of time. Furthermore, each party can retrieve the current
state of FL and smart contracts in one round.
4.1.3 Commitment scheme. One cryptographic primitive that is used in our model is the commit-
ment scheme. A commitment scheme consists of two following algorithms (Com,Vr f ):
• Com(m, r ): given a messagem, random nonce r , returns commitment c
• Vr f (c,R): given a commitment c , and R ≜ (m, r ), wherem is a message, r is a random nonce,
returns 1 iff c = Com(m, r ), otherwise returns 0.
We assume that there is no adversary A that can generate a commitment c and the tuples (m, r ),
(m′, r ′), such that c = Com(m, r ) = Com(m′, r ′). Simply speaking, a party cannot alter the value
after they have committed to it.
4.2 Ideal functionality
First, we define the ledger’s ideal functionality FL . Based on section 4.1, the FL supports adding
and subtracting one’s balance, hence, we give the corresponding definition in Figure 4.
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Functionality FL
Store a vector (x1,x2, ...,xn) that denotes the balance of n parties.
Adding and subtracting balances.
• On input update(pi , s):
(1) If s ≥ 0, set xi = xi + s
(2) If s < 0 and xi ≥ −s , set xi = xi + s
(3) Otherwise, reply with an error () message and stop.
Fig. 4. Ledger’s functionality FL
The formal definition of the ideal functionality Fauction is presented in Figure 5. As can be seen,
it supports the following functionalities:
• Open channel
• Determine best response
• Revocation
• Close channel
As indicated in [6], a state channel should be able to guarantee the consensus on creation and
closing. The state channel creation is initiated by receiving a create() message from a party. The
functionality then waits for receiving create() from all other parties within 1 + (n − 1)∆ rounds. If
this happens then the functionality removes a deposit from each party’s balance on the blockchain.
Since all parties have to send the create() message, we achieve the consensus on creation.
Each iteration k of the double auction process starts with receiving the best_response(k)message
from a party. Then all parties must submit a commitment of their bids. After that, all parties must
submit the true bid that matches with the commitment they sent before. Any party fails to submit
in time or does not submit the true bid will be eliminated from the double auction process. With
the commitment step, one party cannot see the other parties’ bid prior to placing his or her own
bid, this satisfies the Input independence.
When one party fails to behave honestly, it will be eliminated from the auction process and will
not receive the deposit back. A party can voluntarily abort an auction process by sending a revoke()
message and it will receive the deposit back. Then, the auction can continue with the remaining
parties. Therefore, the functionality satisfies the Robustness. Moreover, a malicious party cannot
delay the execution of the protocol for an arbitrary amount of time, because after timeout, the
execution still proceeds. In the best case, when everyone behaves honestly and does not terminate
in the middle of the auction process, the computation is processed within O(1) rounds, otherwise,
O(∆) rounds. Thus, the Liveness is satisfied.
In the end, the state channel begins its termination procedure upon receiving a close() message
from a party. Next, it awaits obtaining the close() messages from the remaining parties within
1+ (|P| − 1)∆ rounds. If all the parties are unanimous in closing the state channel, the functionality
returns the deposit back to all parties’ account. Otherwise, the state channel remains open. As all
parties have to send the close() message to close the state channel, we achieve the consensus on
closing.
4.3 Protocol for double auction state channel
This section discusses in details the double auction protocol based on state channel that realizes
the Fauction . The protocol includes two main parts: 1) a Judge contact and 2) Off-chain protocol.
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Functionality Fauction
Open channel.
• On input create() from pi
(1) For each party pj , j , i , wait to receive create(). If not receiving after 1 + (n − 1)∆ rounds
then stop.
(2) Otherwise, instruct FL to remove a deposit from each of the party’s account on the
blockchain within ∆ rounds.
(3) channel = created
Determine best response.
• On input best_response(k) from pi
– Commitment:
(1) For each party pi , wait until receivingC(k)i = Com(b(k)i , r (k)i ) from pi where b(k )i is the bid
and r (k)i is a random nonce.
(2) If any party pi fails to submit the commitment within 1 round, remove pi from P then
stop.
– Reveal and compute:
(1) For each party pi , wait until receiving R(k )i = (b(k )i , r (k )i ) from pi .
(2) If any party pi fails to submit within 1 round or Vr f (C(k)i ,R(k )i ) = 0, remove pi from P
then stop.
(3) Compute best response Gk based on b = {b(k)i |pi ∈ P}
(4) Send Gk to all parties in 1 round.
Revocation.
• On input revoke() from pi : within ∆ rounds
(1) remove pi from P, add the deposit to pi ’s balance on the blockchain
Close channel.
• On input close() from pi : if pi < P then stop. Otherwise:
(1) Within 1 + (|P| − 1)∆ rounds, wait for receiving close() from pj , j , i
(2) If fails to receive then stop.
(3) Else, within ∆ rounds, add the deposit to every party pi ’s balance on the blockchain, where
pi ∈ P
(4) channel = ⊥
Fig. 5. Ideal functionality Fauction
Judge contract. The main functionality of this contract is to regulate the state channel and handle
disputes. Every party is able to submit a state that everyone has agreed on to this contract. However,
the contract only accepts the state with the highest version number. Once a party submits a state
G, the contract will wait for some deadline T for other parties to raise disputes. See Figure 6 for
the functionality of the Judge contract. Note that the contract FJudдe has a state variable channel
which indicates whether the channel is opened or not. If the channel is not opened (channel = ⊥),
the three functionalities "State submission", "Revocation", and "Close channel" cannot be executed.
In the same manner, if the channel is already opened (channel = created) then the functionality
"Open channel" cannot be executed.
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Contract FJudдe
Open channel.
• On input create() from pi :
– For each party pj , j , i , wait to receive create(). If not receiving after ∆ rounds then stop.
– Otherwise:
∗ channel = created .
∗ instruct FL to remove a deposit from each of the party’s account on the blockchain
within ∆ rounds.
∗ Initialize bestVersion = −1, state = ∅, f laд = ⊥, the set of parties P
State submission.
• On input state_submit(pr ,v,G,proo f ) from pi
(1) if pr , ⊥, wait for (|P| − 2)∆ rounds. Then, if it receives state_submit(p ′r ,v ′,G ′,proo f ′),
such that p ′r = pr , from all parties except pr and pi , then remove pr from P
(2) if v ≤ bestVersion then stop.
(3) Verify the signatures of P on G and verify the state G using proo f . If failed then stop
(4) bestVersion = v
(5) state = G
(6) f laд = dispute
(7) Set f laд = ⊥ after a deadline of T rounds unless bestVersion is changed.
Revocation.
• On input revoke() from pi : within ∆ rounds
(1) remove pi from P, instruct FL to add the deposit to pi ’s balance on the blockchain
Close channel.
• On input close() from pi : if pi < P then stop. Otherwise:
(1) If f laд = dispute then stop.
(2) Within 1 + (|P| − 1)∆ rounds, wait for receiving close() from pj , j , i
(3) If fails to receive then stop.
(4) Else, within ∆ rounds, add the deposit to every party pi ’s balance on the blockchain, where
pi ∈ P
(5) channel = ⊥
Fig. 6. Judge contract
As the contract always maintains the valid state on which all parties have agreed (by verifying
all the signatures), we can publicly verify if all parties are following the protocol. A dishonest party
who attempts to submit an outdated state will be detected as the smart contract is public, that state
would be then overwritten by a more recent state. When the state channel is closed, the contract
is now holding the latest state with the final bids of all the parties, and by the immutability of
blockchain, no bidder can deny having made the relevant bid. Therefore, this contract satisfies the
Non-Repudiation and Public Verifiability goals.
Off-chain protocol . In this section, we present the off-chain protocol that operates among parties
in a double auction process. In the same manner as Fauction , the protocol consists of four parts:
(1) Create state channel, (2) Determine best response, (3) Revocation, and (4) Close state channel.
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Protocol : Create state channel
Party pi : On input create() from environment
(1) Send create() to FJudдe and wait for 1 + (n − 1)∆ rounds.
Party pj,i : Upon pi sends create() to FJudдe
(2) Send create() to FJudдe and wait for (n − 2)∆ rounds.
For each party:
(3) If FJudдe (channel) = created then outputs created() to the environment.
Fig. 7. Protocol : Create state channel
Protocol: Submit(pi ,pr ,v,G)
Party pi
(1) If pr = ⊥ and v ≤ Fjudдe (bestVersion) then stop.
(2) Otherwise, construct proo f for G and send state_submit(pr ,v,G,proo f ) to FJudдe in ∆
rounds.
(3) Wait until Fjudдe (f laд) = ⊥ then stop.
Party pj,i : On Fjudдe (f laд) = dispute
(4) If the latest valid stateGk has k > Fjudдe (bestVersion) then construct proo f forGk and send
state_submit(⊥,k,Gk ,proo f ) to FJudдe in ∆ rounds.
(5) Wait until Fjudдe (f laд) = ⊥ then stop.
Fig. 8. Protocol: Submit
Figure 12 illustrates the connections among these parts as well as the execution order of the
protocol.
First, to create a new state channel, the environment sends a message create() to one of the
parties. Let’s denote this initiating party as pi . The detailed protocol is shown in Figure 7. pi will
send a create() message to the smart contract FJudдe which will take ∆ rounds to get confirmed on
the blockchain. As this message is visible to the whole network, any pj,i can detect this event and
also send a create() message to FJudдe . To detect this event, each pj needs to retrieve the current
state of blockchain which takes 1 round and as there are n − 1 parties pj , pi has to wait 1 + (n − 1)∆
rounds. If all parties agree on creating the state channel, this process will be successful and the
channel will be opened. After that, the smart contract will take a deposit from the account of each
party.
When parties run into dispute, they will have to resolve on-chain. In specific, the procedure
Submit() as shown in Figure 8 allows any party to submit the current state to the smart contract.
However, as stated above, FJudдe only considers the valid state that has the highest version number.
In this procedure, we also define a proo f of a state G. Based on the algorithm used for double
auction, this proo f is anything that can verify whether the calculation ofG in an iteration is correct
or not. For example, proo f can be all the valid bids in that iteration. When any party submits a state,
the FJudдe will raise the state variable f laд = dispute . Upon detecting this event, other parties
can submit their states if they have higher version numbers. After a deadline of T rounds, if none
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Protocol: Determine best response
Party pi : On input best_response(k) from the environment
(1) Broadcast C(k )i = Com(b(k )i , r (k )i ) to other parties and wait for 1 round. Then go to step 4.
Party pj,i : On input C(k)i from pi
(2) Broadcast C(k )j = Com(b(k )j , r (k )j ) to other parties and wait for 1 round.
(3) If there exists a party pl,j such that it doesn’t receiveC(k)l then execute Submit(pl ,k−1,Gk−1)
and stop.
Party pi
(4) If there exists a party pj such that it doesn’t receiveC(k )j then execute Submit(pj ,k − 1,Gk−1)
and stop.
(5) Broadcast R(k)i = (b(k )i , r (k )i ) to other parties and wait for 1 round. Then go to step 8.
Party pj,i : On input R(k)i from pi
(6) Broadcast R(k)j = (b(k )j , r (k )j ) to other parties and wait for 1 round.
(7) If there exists a party pl,j such that it doesn’t receive R(k )l orVr f (C
(k )
l ,R
(k )
l ) = 0 then execute
Submit(pl ,k − 1,Gk−1) and stop.
Party pi
(8) If there exists a party pj such that it doesn’t receive R(k )j or Vr f (C(k )j ,R(k )j ) then execute
Submit(pj ,k − 1,Gk−1) and stop.
(9) Compute best response Gk , siдGkpi = siдnpi (Gk ) and broadcast best_response(Gk , siдGkpi ) to
other parties. Wait for 1 round then go to step 13.
Party pj,i : On input best_response(Gk , siдGkpi ) from pi
(10) Verify Gk
(11) If Gk is not correct then execute Submit(pi ,k − 1,Gk−1) and stop.
(12) Otherwise, let siдGkpj = siдnpj (Gk ) and broadcast veri f ied(Gk , siдGkpj ) to other parties. Then
wait for 1 round.
For each party:
(13) If there exists a party pl,i such that it doesn’t receive veri f ied(Gk , siдGkpl ) then execute
Submit(pl ,k − 1,Gk−1) and stop.
Fig. 9. Protocol : Determine best response
of the parties can submit a newer state, FJudдe will set f laд = ⊥ to conclude the dispute period.
Furthermore, we also note that this procedure also supports eliminating any dishonest party that
does not follow the protocol by setting the parameter pr to that party. This function requires a
unanimous agreement among the remaining honest parties. If a party pi wants to eliminate a party
pr , it will need other parties, except pr , to call the Submit() protocol to remove pr from P.
Next, in Figure 9, we present the protocol for determining the best response which only consists
of off-chain messages if all the parties are honest. In each iteration k , this process starts when
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Protocol : Revocation
Party pi : On input revoke() from the environment
(1) Send revoke() to FJudдe in ∆ rounds then stop.
Party pj,i : On changes of Fjudдe (P)
(2) Update the local P with Fjudдe (P)
Fig. 10. Protocol : Revocation
Protocol : Close state channel
Party pi : On input close() from environment
(1) If FJudдe (f laд) = dispute then stop.
(2) Send close() to FJudдe and wait for 1 + (|P| − 1)∆ rounds. Then go to step 4
Party pj,i : Upon pi sends close() to FJudдe
(3) Send close() to FJudдe and wait for (|Fauction(P)| − 2)∆ rounds.
For each party:
(4) Wait for ∆ rounds and check if FJudдe (channel) = ⊥ then outputs closed() to the environment.
Fig. 11. Protocol : Close state channel
the environment sends best_response(k) to a party pi . Again, this does not violate the trustless
property since pi can be any party chosen at random. First, pi broadcasts the commitment C(k)i of
its bid which only takes one round since this is an off-chain message. Other parties upon receiving
this message will also broadcast their commitments. Then, pi proceeds to broadcast the opening
R(k )i of its bid and hence, other parties upon receiving this R
(k )
i also broadcast their openings. If any
party refuses to send their bids or sends an invalid bid, other parties will call the Submit procedure
to eliminate that dishonest party from the auction process. Thus, that party will lose all the deposit.
In practice, one may consider refunding a portion of deposit back to that party. To achieve this,
we only need to modify the first line of the functionality "State submission" in FJudдe to return a
portion of deposit to pr .
During the auction process, some parties may want to abort the auction process. In order to
avoid losing the deposit, they must use the Revocation protocol described in Figure 10 to send
a revoke() message to FJudдe . In this case, they will get the deposit back in full and be removed
from the set P. Other parties upon detecting this operation also update their local P to ensure the
consistency.
Finally, Figure 11 illustrates the protocol for closing the state channel. One technical point in
this protocol is that we must check whether there is any ongoing dispute. If so then we must not
close the channel. In the same way of opening the channel, a party pi also initiates the request by
sending a message close() to the smart contract. Upon detecting this event, other parties may also
send close(). If all parties agreed on closing the channel, they will get the deposit back.
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Fig. 12. Connections and execution order of the functionalities of the proposed protocol. The "Revocation"
functionality can be triggered any time between "Create state channel" and "Close state channel". Any dispute
occurred during the "Determine best response" requires a call to the "Submit" functionality.
4.4 Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we prove the security of our solution in the UC model. We denote EXECπ ,A,E as
the outputs of the environment E when interacting with the parties running the protocol π and
the adversary A. From [15], we have the following definition:
Definition 4.1 (UC-security). A protocol π UC-realizes an ideal functionality F if for any adver-
sarial A, there exists a simulator S such that for any environment E the outputs EXECπ ,A,E and
EXECF,S,E are computationally indistinguishable
The main goal of this analysis is to prove that the off-chain protocol UC-realizes the ideal
functionality Fauction by constructing a simulator S in the ideal world that translates every
attacker in the real world, such that the two worlds are indistinguishable. To achieve that, we need
to ensure the consistency of timings, i. e., the environment E must receive the same message in the
same round in both worlds. Furthermore, in any round, the internal state of each party must be
identical between the two worlds, which will make E unable to perceive whether it is interacting
with the real world or the ideal one.
Per Canetti [3], the strategy for proving the UC-security is constructing the simulator S that
handles the corrupted parties and simulates the (Fjudдe ,FL)-hybrid world while interacting with
Fauction . The simulator will maintain a copy of the hybrid world internally so that it can turn every
behavior in the hybrid world into an indistinguishable one in the real world. We further assume that
upon receiving a message from a party, the ideal functionality Fauction will leak that message to
the simulator. For simplicity, we do not elaborate these operations when constructing the simulator.
Since S locally runs a copy of the hybrid world, S knows the behavior of the corrupted parties and
the messages sent from A to FJudдe , therefore, S can instruct the Fauction to update the ledger L
in the same manner as the hybrid word.
In specification of the off-chain protocol, the protocol Submit in Figure 8 is called as a sub-routine
of the protocol Determine best response in Figure 9. Hence, we first define a simulator for the
protocol Submit by proving the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Under the assumptions given in section 4.1, we can construct a simulator for the protocol
Submit in the ideal world such that the view of E remains the same in both the ideal world and the
(Fjudдe ,FL)-hybrid world.
Proof. Let pi be the party that calls the Submit() protocol, we define S_Submit() as the simulator
of the protocol Submit(). If pi is corrupted, upon pi sends state_submit(pr ,v,G,proo f ) to FJudдe
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(1) S_Submit() waits for ∆ rounds. If pr = ⊥ then stop.
(2) Otherwise, S_Submit() waits for (|P| − 2)∆ rounds
(3) If all parties pj,{i,r } send state_submit(pr ,v,G,proo f ) to FJudдe then instruct Fauction to
remove pr from P.
If pj,i is corrupted, S_Submit() also updates its P in the same round as the real world if FJudдe
updates P.
Since the protocol Submit() can potentially change the internal state of the Fjudдe and the parties
by removing a party from P, the S_Submit() ensures that Fauction also performs the same operation
in the same round. Hence, the view of both worlds are consistent. □
Finally, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3. Under the assumptions given in section 4.1, the proposed off-chain protocol UC-realizes
the ideal functionality Fauction in the (Fjudдe ,FL)-hybrid model.
Proof. We provide the description of S for each of the functionalities as follows.
Open channel. Let pi be the party that initiates the request. We inspect the following cases:
• pi is corrupted: Upon pi sends create() to FJudдe
(1) S waits for ∆ rounds
(2) Then sends create() to Fauction to make sure that Fauction receives create() in the same
round as FJudдe . Then wait for 1 + (n − 1)∆ rounds
(3) if Fauction(channel) = created then sends created() to E on behalf of pi .
• pj,i is corrupted: Upon pi sends create() to Fauction
(1) S waits for ∆ rounds
(2) If pj sends create() to FJudдe then S sends create() to Fauction and wait for (n−2)∆ rounds
(3) if Fauction(channel) = created then sends created() to E on behalf of pj
In all cases above, according to Figure 7, pi or pj will output created() to E if Fauction(channel) =
created . Hence, S also outputs created() in the same round. Therefore, the environment E receives
the same outputs in the same round in both worlds.
Close channel. Let pi be the party that initiates the request. We inspect the following cases:
• pi is corrupted: Upon pi sends close() to FJudдe
(1) if Fjudдe (f laд) = dispute then stop. Otherwise, S waits for ∆ rounds
(2) Then sends close() to Fauction to make sure that Fauction receives close() in the same round
as FJudдe . Then wait for 1 + (Fauction(|P|) − 1)∆ rounds
(3) Wait for another ∆ round and check if Fauction(channel) = ⊥ then sends close() to E on
behalf of pi .
• pj,i is corrupted: Upon pi sends close() to Fauction
(1) S waits for ∆ rounds
(2) Ifpj sends close() toFJudдe thenS sends close() toFauction andwait for (|Fauction(P)|−2)∆
rounds
(3) Wait for another ∆ round and check if Fauction(channel) = ⊥ then sends closed() to E on
behalf of pj .
The indistinguishability in the view of E between the two worlds holds in the same manner as
Open channel.
Revocation. Let pi be the party that initiates the request. We inspect the following cases:
• pi is corrupted: Upon pi sends revoke() to FJudдe
(1) S waits for ∆ rounds
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(2) Then sends revoke() to Fauction to make sure that Fauction receives revoke() in the same
round as FJudдe .
• pj,i is corrupted: Upon pi sends revoke() to Fauction
(1) If pj updates the local P then S also updates its P.
In both cases, S ensures that the messages exchanged between the entities are identical in both
worlds. Moreover, since P is updated according to the real world, thus the internal state of the each
party are also identical. Therefore, the view of E between the two worlds are indistinguishable.
Determine best response. Based on lemma 4.2, we define S_Submit() as the simulator of the
protocol Submit() in the ideal world. Let pi be the party that calculates the best responses. In each
iteration k , we inspect the following cases:
• pi is corrupted: Upon pi broadcasts C(k )i to other parties
(1) Send C(k )i to Fauction and wait for 1 round.
(2) If Fauction removes any party then stop. If pi executes the Submit() then S also calls the
S_Submit() in the same round.
(3) Otherwise, if pi broadcasts R(k)i to other parties then S sends R(k )i to Fauction and waits for
1 round. Else, stop.
(4) If Fauction removes any party then stop. If pi executes the Submit() then S also calls the
S_Submit() in the same round. Otherwise, wait for 1 round
(5) Receive Gk from Fauction and wait for 1 round.
(6) If pi executes the Submit() then S also calls the S_Submit() in the same round. Otherwise,
stop.
• pj,i is corrupted: Upon pi sends best_response(k) to Fauction
(1) Wait until pi sends C(k )i to Fauction , then forwards that C(k )i to pj in the same round.
(2) If pj broadcastsC(k)j to other parties then S sendsC(k )j to Fauction . Else, execute S_Submit()
to eliminate the party that made pj refuse to broadcast and stop.
(3) Wait for 1 round. If pi sends R(k )i to Fauction , then forwards that R(k )i to pj in the same
round. Otherwise, stop.
(4) If pj broadcasts R(k )j to other parties then S sends R(k )j to Fauction . Else, execute S_Submit()
to eliminate the party that made pj refuse to broadcast and stop.
(5) Wait for 1 round, if S doesn’t receive Gk from Fauction then stop. Otherwise, S forwards
that Gk to pj .
(6) If pj executes the Submit() then S also calls the S_Submit() in the same round. Otherwise,
stop.
Since the messages exchanged between any entities are exact in both worlds, the indistinguisha-
bility in the view of E between the two worlds holds.
□
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present an evaluation of our proposed double auction framework by running
some experiments on a proof-of-concept implementation. Before that, we introduce our novel
development framework for distributed computing on state channels.
5.1 Development framework for distributed computing based on state channels
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that builds a functioning programming framework
that can be used to deploy any distributed protocols using blockchain and state channels. We use
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the Elixir programming language to implement the protocol for the participating parties that run
on Erlang virtual machines (EVM). The smart contract for the state channel is implemented using
the Solidity programming language, which is the official language for realizing smart contracts on
Ethereum. Hence, the whole system can be deployed on an Ethereum blockchain.
The Elixir implementation of the participating parties is designed around the Actor programming
model [10]. This model realizes actors as the universal primitive of concurrent computation that
use message-passing as the communication mechanism. In response to a message, an actor can
make local decisions, send messages to other actors, or dynamically generate more actors. Since
actors in Elixir are "location transparent", when sending a message, whether the recipient actor is
on the same machine or on another machine, the EVM can manage to deliver the message in both
cases. In our framework, each of the parties is treated as a separate actor, and they communicate
with each other using asynchronous message-passing mechanism. Furthermore, in other for the
parties to interact with the smart contract, we leverage a remote procedure call protocol encoded
in JSON (JSON-RPC) provided by Ethereum. The actors also listen for triggered events (e.g., the
channel is opening) from the smart contract and carry out appropriate action.
To develop a distributed computing system using our framework, one would only have to define
the followings:
(1) The state of the system at each iteration.
(2) The operation to be executed at each iteration.
(3) The off-chain messages to be exchanged among the parties of the system.
(4) The rule to resolve disputes.
To demonstrate the feasibility of this development framework, we use it to develop a proof-of-
concept implementation of the proposed double auction protocol in the next section.
5.2 Proof-of-concept implementation of double auction
We create a proof-of-concept implementation of our proposed double auction protocol using our
development framework as illustrated above. Our implementation of the Judge contract closely
resembles the protocol from Figure 6, it is developed in the Truffle framework [24], and later
deployed on an Ethereum testnet managed by Ganache [23]. Our main goal was to illustrate
the feasibility and practicality of our off-chain protocols when interacting with the Judge smart
contracts. As regards the commitment scheme, we used the SHA-256 hash function with a random
string of 64 characters.
One crucial evaluation criteria when working with smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain
are costs incurred by transaction fees. In Ethereum, these fees are calculated using a special
unit called "gas", the fee is paid by the sender of a transaction to the miner that validates that
transaction. Transactions in an Ethereum blockchain can provide inputs to and execute smart
contract’s functions. The amount of gas used for each transaction is determined by the amount of
data it sends and the computational effort that it will take to execute certain operations. In addition,
depending on the exchange rate between gas and ETH (Ethereum’s currency), we can determine the
final cost in ETH. In practice, this exchange rate is decided by the person who issues transactions
depending on how much they want to prioritize their transactions in the mining pool. As we are
using the Ganache testnet, in our calculation, we use the default gas price of 1 gas = 2 × 10−8 Ether.
To deploy the Judge contract, we have to pay 3387400 gas, which corresponds to 0.0677 ETH.
Using an exchange rate of 1 ETH = 152.49 USD (as of Nov 2019), the deployment of the contract
costs approximately 10.3 USD. We also note that our proof-of-concept implementation did not aim
to optimize the deployment cost since we implement every functionality on a single smart contract.
To mitigate this cost, we would only need to transfer all functionalities of the Judge contract into
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(a) Straw-man design (b) Using state channel
Fig. 13. Cumulative gas consumption over time
an external library. Hence, this library only requires one-time deployment, instances of the Judge
contract can refer to this library and re-use its functionalities. Therefore, we can save much of the
deployment cost since we don’t have to re-deploy all the functionalities with each instance of the
Judge contract. Thus, in the following section, we disregard this deployment cost when evaluating
the performance of our system.
5.3 Experiments
For the experiments, we run the system on machines equipped with an Intel Core i7-8550U CPU 1.8
GHz and 16 GB of RAM. The mean latency for transmitting a 32-byte message from one party to
another is about 101.2 ms. We assume that, in the beginning, the parties of the system collected the
public keys of each other. Moreover, each party also created an account on the Ethereum testnet.
Since this is a one-time setup procedure, we do not take it into consideration when evaluating our
system. To receive events from the Judge contract, each party periodically checks for triggered
events from the Judge contract every 100 ms. To illustrate the double auction process, we follow the
setup of a numerical experiment in [30] that consists of 10 parties in total, in which 6 are buyers
and 4 are sellers. The auction process takes a total of 300 iterations to reach NE.
First, we implemented the straw-man design as described in Section 3.2. Figure 13a shows the
cumulative gas consumption over time. As can be seen, the gas consumption increases linearly with
the iterations. This happens because each iteration requires parties to send on-chain transactions
to the smart contract. In sum, the straw-man design used 121913080 gas, which corresponds to
2.44 ETH. This means the design incurs a cost of about 372 USD to carry out the double auction
process. Furthermore, if we consider the Ethereum’s block time of 15 seconds per block, it could
take over 75 minutes to complete the process (assuming that the waiting time in the mining pool is
negligible).
Next, we run the double auction on our proof-of-concept implementation. If all the parties
unanimously agree to create the state channel, they need to issue 10 on-chain transactions that
cost about 0.0117 ETH (each party needs to send 1 transaction to the smart contract). For closing
the state channel, they need another 10 transactions that cost about 0.0109 ETH. The whole double
auction process is executed off-chain and doesn’t cost any gas or ETH. In Figure 13b, which shows
the cumulative gas consumption over time, we can observe that only the first and last iteration
incurs some amount of gas to create and close the state channel, respectively. As a result, the
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Table 1. The estimated costs for executing the transactions as well as the message complexity of the proposed
double auction protocol when running with 10 parties.
# on-chain tx Gas ETH # off-chain message
Create state channel 10 586180 0.0117 0
Double auction process 0 0 0 81000
Close state channel 10 547240 0.0109 0
proposed protocol only incurs 20 on-chain transactions and 1133420 gas. With comparison to the
straw-man design, we reduced the amount of transactions and gas by 99%. Additionally, regarding
the nominal cost, our solution requires only 0.0226 ETH, which is about 3 USD, to conduct the
auction process. Table 1 summarizes the costs of execution of our proposed system.
For a more detailed analysis, we look into other scenarios and measure some aspects of the
system. One scenario to consider is when a party becomes dishonest and attempts to close the state
channel with an outdated state. In order to do that, the dishonest party has to submit the outdated
state using the state_submit function of the Judge contract, this costs about 52845 gas. After that,
another party would submit a more recent state that can overwrite that outdated state, this costs
another 52845 gas. Consequently, the cost for settling a disagreement would be about 0.0021 ETH
for both the dishonest and honest party.
Another scenario that is worth looking into is the dynamic leave of parties. The two cases
supported by our system are (1) eliminating dishonest parties and (2) voluntarily aborting the
auction process. In the former case, when eliminating a party via the state_submit function, it
requires 9 on-chain transactions that cost a total of 0.0122 ETH. In the latter case, using the
Revocation protocol, only the leaving party needs to issue a transaction that costs about 0.0011
ETH.
To analyze the execution cost, we focus on the cost of computing digital signatures and message
complexity since these are additional work that the parties have to perform apart from computing
best responses. As in the protocol design, in each iteration, each party has to sign the current state
and broadcast it to all other parties. A state of an iteration is defined as the list of parties’ best
responses and it is about 80 bytes (each party’s bid profile is 8 bytes). The time it takes to sign the
state is about 1.4 ms and to verify the signature is about 0.8 ms. As for broadcasting bids among
parties, a commitment of 32 bytes (using SHA-256 hash function) is sent and later accompanied
by the opening of 72 bytes (including the bid and the random string). This incurs a total of 270
off-chain messages that are transmitted per iteration with the total size of 23 KB. If we consider the
whole auction process that involves 300 iterations, the total size of the messages transmitted among
the parties is only 6.9 MB. This emphasizes the practicality of our proposed solution because of
low transmission overhead.
Finally, we measure the end-to-end latency of the auction process. For the creating and closing
state channel, each will take one block time (i.e., about 15 seconds in Ethereum). The 300 iterations
of determining best responses takes only about 8.3 minutes. To test the scalability, we observe
how the system latency changes when we increase the number of parties. For a fair comparison,
we fix the number of iterations for the double auction process to 300. In Figure 14a, we show the
end-to-end latency with 10, 40, 70, and 100 parties. The total time to create and close the state
channel remains the same because each operation only needs one block time as a block in Ethereum
can store about 380 transactions. When we increase the number of parties to 40, the system needs
833.4 seconds to finish the auction process. The rise in the latency comes from the fact that the size
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Fig. 14. End-to-end latency
of the state at each iteration increases (from 80 bytes to 320 bytes), hence, it takes longer to transmit
the state as well as to compute the digital signatures. However, we note that with 40 parties, this
latency is only 1.6 times as much as the latency with 10 parties. Likewise, when we increase the
number of parties by 9 times (to 100 parties), the latency only increases by 2.9 times. Therefore, we
can see that the proposed solution is able to scale with the number of parties.
To better capture the performance of our system under heavy load, Figure 14b illustrates the
end-to-end delay with thousands of trading parties over 300 iterations. For creating and closing
state channel, it would take 6, 12, 16, 22, and 28 block time with 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000
parties, respectively. As can be seen, the latency increases linearly with the number of parties.
Under this load, the size of the state reaches 40000 bytes at 5000 parties, and the end-to-end latency
is dominated by the time it takes to transmit the state at each iteration. Therefore, the performance
of our system is only limited by the underlying communication channel.
In summary, the proof-of-concept implementation has demonstrated that our solution is both
feasible and practical, all the functionalities work according to the design in Section 4. With
comparison to the straw-man design, our implementation has resulted in a gigantic saving of
money and time. Moreover, as the proposed solution induces a relatively small overhead, it is able
support a high number of trading parties.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework based on blockchain that enables a complete
decentralized and trustless iterative double auction. That is, all parties can participate in the auction
process without having to rely on an auctioneer and they do not have to trust one another. With
an extension of the state channel technology, we were able to specify a protocol that reduces the
blockchain transactions to avoid high transaction fee and latency. We have provided a formal
specification of the framework and our protocol was proven to be secured in the UC model. Finally,
we have developed a proof-of-concept implementation and perform experiments to validate the
feasibility and practicality of our solution.
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